

THE UNITED STATES

AND

TURKEY.

Sanctuary
Christopher Oscanyan.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

McGILL & WITHEROW, PRINTERS AND STEREOTYPERS.

1868.

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Christopher Oscanyan (Hatchik Osanyan), the author of this brochure, was the Ottoman Consul-General in New York. An intelligent propagandist, he was also the author of The Sultan and his People, by a Native of Turkey (New York, Derby and Jackson, 1857), 456 pages. He was born in 1818.

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For two years past, and particularly during its last session, the attention of the Congress of the United States has been directed towards the affairs of the East (or the Orient.) Two questions have been, above all others, the objects of its deliberations: that of the insurrection in Crete, which brought forth the resolutions of July 20, 1867, and of July 21, 1868; and that of the right to free passage through the Straits of Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, which was agitated during the session of July 6, 1868.

It will not, then, be without advantage thoroughly to sift these two questions: presenting them in their true light, and gathering from such an examination their essential points, in view of a new discussion, of which they might become the subject in the halls of the American Legislature.

HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Negotiations of the first treaty of the United States with the Sublime 'Porte,' (1830.)

On the 6th of July last a member of the House of Representatives, Mr. Kelley, made the following proposition to Congress:

“*Resolved*, That the President be requested to instruct the Minister of the United States to the Sublime Porte to urge upon the Government of the Sultan the abolition of all restrictions and charges upon the passage of vessels of war and commerce through the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus to the Black Sea, and to endeavor to procure the perfect freedom of navigation through those Straits to all classes of vessels.”

The two points which this proposition includes are so different in their nature, and so mutually opposed in many respects, that we shall, in our treatment of this subject, consider separately those component parts which Mr. Kelley, for reasons thus far unknown, sees fit thus to mingle and confound. In pursuing this course we shall act in accordance not only with the statesmen of Europe, but also with those of America, and especially with the negotiators of the treaty of commerce which was concluded between the United States and Turkey on the 7th of May, 1830.

It would be well, indeed, to compare the attitude, at once reserved and open, which those statesmen of the Union preserved during the entire course of their long and laborious negotiation, (which continued from 1820 to 1830,) with that very different one which the Kelley proposition, if adopted by Congress, would necessarily force upon the Federal Government. The negotiators of 1830 had in view three objects: the enjoy-

ment of the privileges accorded to France in 1740; the obtaining for the merchant vessels of the Union the free entrance of the Black Sea; the power to appoint consuls in the ports of Turkey. The commissioners* were instructed to confine themselves to the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation. In vain the Government of the Porte† endeavored to extend the field of these negotiations, and to insert in the treaty political clauses, whose advantages seemed to them a compensation for the concessions which they made to the commerce of the United States; the American plenipotentiaries‡, at the risk of retarding indefinitely the conclusion of the treaty, refused to pass beyond the limits indicated in their instructions, and to follow the Ottoman ministers into political ground. Notwithstanding they had to surmount great obstacles§, which were, as we shall see hereafter, not from the ill-will of the Turkish Government, (or of the Porte,) but from the rivalries and jealousies then existing among the European Powers.|| If the Cabinet of Washington, immediately after the battle of Navarino, had agreed to promise war vessels to the Porte;¶ if they had been ready, according to custom, (and as they were in some sort invited to do, by the VIIth Article of the Convention of Ackerman,**) to demand the co-operation of a Power friendly to the Porte;†† they might thus have removed all difficulties, and have hastened the issue of their negotiations. The American Government nevertheless persisted in preserving its neutrality and independence, as is clearly attested by the following passage, found in the report of Mr. Rhind to General Jackson : ‡‡

*Letter of Mr. Clay to Commodore Rogers, September 6, 1825.

†Letter of Commodore Rogers to Mr. Clay, October 14, 1825.

‡Letter of Commodore Rogers to Captain Pacha.

§Letter of Mr. Offley to Commodore Rogers, November 30, 1825.

§Letter of Mr. Offley to Mr. Clay, November 25, 1827.

||Letter of Mr. Adams to Capt. Crane, July 22, 1828.

¶Letter of Mr. Adams to Mr. Offley, July 21, 1828.

**Letter of Mr. Van Buren to the American commissioners, Sept. 12, 1829.

††Letter of Mr. Van Buren to Capt. Biddle, September 12, 1829.

‡‡Report of Mr. Rhind to General Jackson, May 10, 1830.

"I mentioned the advantages the Porte would derive by having so powerful and disinterested a friend as the United States, whose distant situation and whose principles were opposed to the chicanery and diplomatic intrigues so generally practiced in Europe. That we were a people open, candid, and sincere in all our relations with foreign Powers, and only desired to be on friendly terms, and have a commercial intercourse with all the nations of the earth, our character being purely commercial; and we flattered ourselves that we were distinguished for good faith."

I.

Origin of the principle which admits the closing of the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

When the victorious Sultans commenced to mingle in European politics, and conceded to some of the Powers which had heretofore contended with them an eagerly-sought friendship, they granted to their new allies the highest privileges and most extended immunities. In return, they reserved to themselves the right to forbid to the war-vessels of all foreign Powers the entrance to their waters and their ports; and the countries which enjoyed the benefit of these capitulations, thought so much the less of contending with the Sultans in regard to this right,—as the advantages assured to them by these compacts were enormous, and as it was moreover generally admitted that Powers bordering on inland seas were allowed to refuse entrance to foreign war-vessels. Consequently the armament of merchant vessels, authorized by treaties to navigate the Black Sea, was rigorously limited. Article VI of the convention of March 10, 1779, which placed Russia on the same footing with France and England, formally announces this.*

"The imperial court of Russia willingly admits and promises to decree to its subjects, that the vessels which they shall

* Convention of Constantinople, explanatory of the Treaty of Kainardji, March 10, 1779.

hereafter send into Ottoman ports, shall not be otherwise armed and equipped than those of the nations above mentioned."

It was by virtue of the same principle, that, in the month of May, 1780, the King of Denmark declared* to the belligerent Powers, as well in his own name as in that of the other States bordering upon the Baltic Sea, that the aforesaid sea was closed to war-vessels; and that the Count of Vergennes said in reply,† on the 26th of the same month, that France had no objections to make to this declaration, and would submit to it during the course of hostilities.

The first international act which confirmed this principle.

Such was the interpretation universally allowed in Europe to this point of public right, until it was definitively ratified and sanctioned, in 1841, by the "Convention of the Straits."‡ (Convention des Détroits.) The five great Powers,§ signers of that treaty, had also another object in view in sending their representatives to London. They did not simply propose to consecrate, by a solemn and public act, a right which had already been recognized, and to prevent the recurrence of an incident similar to that of the month of April, 1809.

It appears from the despatches exchanged at that time by the statesmen who directed those negotiations, that they had in consideration a still more particular and more precisely-defined object: that of guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman empire. Turkey, enfeebled both by the war with Greece and by the revolt of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt, had formally solicited this guaranty; but the ministers of that day (particularly M. de Metternich) were inclined to

* Declaration of King of Denmark, May, 1780.

† Reply of Count of Vergennes, May 26, 1780.

‡ Convention of London, called "Convention of the Straits," July 13, 1841.

§ Circulars of the S. Porte, of dates Jan. 9, 1807, and April 10, 1809.

refuse it. This latter fact did not lessen either in urgency, or in general European interest, the impression of the necessity of a measure, equivalent to a collective guarantee, in favor of Turkey, similar to that accorded to Belgium and Greece. Some, indeed, foresaw, even at that epoch, that the guarantee desired would at a later day become indispensable, but all judged that the action of the convention sufficed at least for the time being.*

This Convention of the Straits, (Convention des D troits,) of date July 13, 1841, announced, in effect, on the one hand,† “that the Sultan had declared his firm determination to maintain in the future the principle invariably enforced as an ancient law of his empire, by virtue of which the war-vessels of foreign Powers had always been prohibited from entrance into the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus; and that, so soon as the Porte should find itself again at peace, his Highness would not permit any foreign war-vessel within the said Straits;” while, on the other hand, the signing Powers pledged themselves to respect this declaration of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above announced.

In Article II, the Sultan reserved to himself, as heretofore, the power to issue “firmans” (or permits) of passage to the light vessels, or flag-ships, which should be employed, as in customary, in the service of the legations of friendly Powers.

Such was the tenor of the decisions of that convention, which was not imposed by the Porte upon these European Powers, but whose conclusions these Powers themselves spontaneously demanded, as a warranty for European order, and as a safeguard, which should thereafter render impossible

* Two notes of Latour Maubourg, April, 1809.

* Despatch of P. de Metternich, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron de St rmer, internuncio of Austria to Constantinople, April 20, 1841.

* Despatch of Lord Palmerston to the British ambassador at Vienna, May 10, 1841.

* Despatch of the British representative in Berlin to Lord Palmerston, May 19, 1841.

* Note of Baron de Brunnow to Lord Palmerston, May 15, 1841.

† Projet or plan of the protocol, March 9, 1841.

concessions so dangerous as were those made to Russia by the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.*

The incident of the "*baie des Barbiers*," (Bay of the Barbers) in 1849, showed with what vigilant watchfulness these Powers enforced the execution of the foregoing international act, and served at the same time to determine clearly those limits which his vessels could not overstep.†

Stipulations of the treaty of Paris, 1856.

At a later date in 1856, the foresight of the negotiators of 1841 was justified, and the European Powers were compelled, in order, as far as possible, to avoid the recurrence of a war similar to that of 1854, to guaranty, by the "treaty of Paris," the integrity of the Ottoman empire. This treaty renewed and completed the stipulations of 1841. We find in Protocol No. 4, in the annex to Protocol No. 10, and in the addenda 11 to Protocol No. 16, clauses which are in substance reproduced in the instrument of peace, signed March 30, 1856; and also in the resolutions passed on the same day in the conventions between Russia and Turkey.

We read in the treaty of peace‡—

ARTICLE X. "The act of the convention of July 13, 1841, which maintained the ancient law of the Ottoman empire relative to the closing of the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, has been reviewed by common consent. The said act concluded to this effect, and conformably to this principle, between the high contracting Powers, is and remains annexed to this treaty, and will have the same force and power as if forming an integral part of the same."

ARTICLE XII. "The Black Sea is 'neutral ground,' open

*Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, July 8, 1833.

†Note of the Russian envoy to the S. Porte, October 24, 1849.

‡Reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the S. Porte to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, close of December, 1849.

‡Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856.

to the marine commerce of all nations; its waters and its ports are formally and perpetually interdicted to war-vessels, whether of bordering or distant Powers, save as regards the exceptions mentioned in Articles XIV and XIX of the present treaty."

These Articles XIV and XIX are found in the report of the action of the conventions between Russia and the Sublime Porte, and are also annexed to this treaty.

The one relates to the closing of the Straits, and is simply a reproduction of that of July 14, 1841, with a single additional clause referring to the flag-ships which each contracting Power is authorized to station at the mouths of the Danube, (in order to insure the execution of the regulations relative to the freedom of that river,) whose number is not to exceed two to each Power.

The other article governs the extent of the forces which Russia and Turkey are empowered to maintain in the Black Sea. The principal provisions are as follows:

ARTICLE I. "The high contracting Powers mutually pledge themselves not to maintain in the Black Sea other war-vessels than those whose number, force, and dimensions are hereinafter stipulated.

ARTICLE II. "The high contracting Powers reserve, each to themselves, the right to maintain, in the aforementioned Sea, six steam-vessels of fifty metres in length, each (measured at water-line) of eight hundred tons burthen at the maximum, and four light steam or sail-vessels, which are not to exceed two hundred tons burthen each."

II.

Facilities accorded to navigation in the Black Sea.

In proportion as the Sublime Porte, strong in its right, and supported by treaties, has always rigorously interdicted the entrance of the Straits and of the Black Sea to foreign war-

vessels, so has it always shown a readiness to open its waters to commercial vessels. The history of the commercial navigation of the Black Sea may be divided into two periods: the one of privileges, monopolies, and immunities; commencing with capitulations, and terminating with the treaty of Adrianople, (September 14, 1829;) the other extending from the date of this treaty to our own day.

Although the discovery of America (forty years after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks) opened a new market to commerce, and new routes to navigation, still the traffic of the Black Sea, which in the middle ages had exclusively enriched the merchants of Genoa and Venice, preserved sufficient importance to tempt the cupidity of all the maritime nations of Europe.*

Up to the time of this treaty of Adrianople, the commerce of the Black Sea had been a privilege, accorded at first to France by the capitulations of 1535, 1569, 1581, 1604, 1673, 1740; to England, by the capitulations of 1579, 1606, 1641, which were renewed by the treaty of commerce of 1675, and finally by the treaty of January 5, 1809; to Austria, by the treaty of 1718; to Russia, by the treaties of 1774, 1779, 1783, and 1826; and, lastly, to the second-rate Powers at different epochs of the eighteenth century.

Article VII of the explanatory convention between Russia and Turkey,† (October 7, 1826,) contains a paragraph (No. 4) thus expressed:

“The Sublime Porte will respond to the kindly offices of the Imperial Court of Russia in so far as to accord, conformably to precedents, the entrance of the Black Sea to the vessels of Powers friendly to the Ottoman Government which have not yet obtained this privilege, in order that the commerce of importation and exportation of Russian products by such means may not be subjected to further hindrances.”

* Sismondi's Italian Republics, XL.

† Convention of Ackerman, explanatory of the treaty of Bucharest, October 7, 1826.

Although in securing this concession Russia contemplated only her own profit. The privilege granted was not the less a step toward commercial liberty, yet restrictions still existed; one, indeed, proceeding from the right of visitation, which the Porte sometimes exercised;* the others, more important, were created by the jealousies of Powers, desirous to enjoy exclusively the benefits of capitulation. These rivalries are nowhere more clearly exposed than in the correspondence of the American negotiators of the treaty of 1830.† Mr. Bradish wrote from Constantinople, on the December 20, 1820, to Mr. Adams:‡

“That narrow system of policy, heretofore pursued by some of the nations of Europe having friendly relations with the Porte, I am§ exceedingly sorry to have occasion to observe, still continues to influence their conduct. This policy would lead the nations influenced by it to endeavor to exclude all others from any participation in the privileges which they themselves enjoy. The United States would be particularly an object of this exclusion, inasmuch as we are, more than any other, an object of jealousy with that nation which is most influenced by this narrow policy.”

This jealousy, which confined itself at first to an indirect opposition, (*Letter of Mr. Van Buren to the American commissioners*,) ended by open manifestations in proportion as the issue of the negotiations approached. (*Report of Mr. Rhind*.)

The Sublime Porte itself, on the contrary, seemed well inclined to extend the privileges of navigation. Mr. Olley wrote, on the 22d April, 1828, to Mr. Clay, that at his request

*Note of the envoy of Russia to the Sublime Porte, April 30, 1821.

* Note of the internuncio of Austria, April 5, 1821.

* Note of the chargé d'affaires of Denmark, April 6, 1821.

† Diplomatic correspondence relative to the negotiation of the treaty of 1830, laid before the Congress of the United States by President Jackson, May 29, 1832.

‡ Letter of Mr. Van Buren to the commissioners, September 12, 1829.

§ Report of Mr. Rhind, cited above.

§ Letter of Mr. Olley to Mr. Clay, April 21, 1828.

the Porte had, in the most obliging manner, granted permission to the American bark *Delos*, coming from Boston, to pass the Straits and enter the Black Sea.

Commercial stipulations of the treaty of Adrianople, confirmed by the treaty of Paris.

But such instances of permissions were still exceptions. The treaty of Adrianople* was conceived in a spirit at once novel, and entirely liberal. Article VII thus concludes :

“The Sublime Porte moreover binds itself to a vigilant watchfulness over the commerce and navigation of the Black Sea, that these may not be liable to any trammels of any nature whatsoever. To this end the Porte recognizes and declares the passage of the Canal of Constantinople and the Strait of Dardanelles to be entirely free and open to Russian vessels, under merchant flag, either laden or in ballast, whether they come from the Black Sea, purposing to enter the Mediterranean, or coming from the Mediterranean, wish to enter the Black Sea. Such vessels, provided they are merchant vessels, whatever may be their size or tonnage, will not be exposed to any hindrance or annoyance whatever, as has been decreed. The two courts will consult as to the surest means for the prevention of all delay in the accomplishment of necessary expeditions. By virtue of this same principle, the passage of the Canal of Constantinople and of the Strait of Dardanelles is declared free and open to all merchant vessels of such Powers as are at peace with the Sublime Porte, whether they seek entrance into the Russian ports of the Black Sea, or whether they come thence laden or in ballast, upon the same conditions which are stipulated in regard to vessels under the Russian flag.”

* Treaty of Adrianople, September 14, 1829.

These contracts were renewed in the treaty of Paris,* in which we read :

Article XII “ Freed from all impediments, commerce, in the ports and waters of the Black Sea, will not be subjected to any other than sanitary, and police, and custom-house regulations, executed in a spirit favorable to the development of commercial transactions. In order to insure desirable security to the commercial and maritime interests of all nations, Russia and the Sublime Porte will admit consuls in their ports which are situated on the borders of the Black Sea, conformably to the principles of international law.”

Last treaty of commerce between Turkey and the United States. (1862.)

We find both the sanction and the complement of these liberal measures in the numerous treaties of commerce which the Porte has signed or renewed in favor of different Powers during the last forty years, and more particularly in that which was concluded with the United States on May 7, 1830, and which was renewed on 25th of February, 1862.†

This treaty includes the stipulation that monopolies and the custom of local permissions are and remain abolished. (Art. II.) It provides further, (Art. IV, V, and following,) that the tax upon exportation of articles of Ottoman production or fabrication shall be eight per cent., calculated upon their value at the port of embarkation, and payable at the time of exportation, with this condition : that this tax^a of eight per cent. shall be annually diminished at the rate of one per cent., until it shall be reduced to a fixed duty of one per cent., (*ad valorem*,) designed to defray the general expenses of administration and superintendence.

* Treaty of Paris, cited above.

† Treaty of commerce between Turkey and the United States, February 25, 1862.

The tax upon importations is fixed at eight per cent., to be calculated upon the value of the articles imported at the place of embarkation and payable at the time of debarkation, if said articles come by sea.

The tax on transit, fixed at first at two per cent., will, at the close of the eighth year, be reduced to a definite tax of one per cent.

Lastly, Article XI, of the American treaty, is thus expressed: "No duty whatever shall be levied on the marketable productions of the soil, or of the industry of the United States; nor upon such productions, whether from the soil or manufacture of any other foreign country, whenever these two kinds of merchandise, embarked on American vessels, shall pass the Straits of Dardanelles, of Bosphorus, or of the Black Sea, whether such merchandise shall pass the Straits in the vessels in which it originally embarked, or be transferred to other ships; or whether, being sold for purposes of exportation, it may be for a limited time deposited on Turkish soil awaiting exchange to other vessels for a continued voyage."

Sanitary, police, and custom-house regulations are made and applied in their most liberal view.

No further hindrances to commerce in Turkish waters now exist, save the sanitary, police, and custom-house regulations mentioned in Article XII of the treaty of Paris. Treaties have for a long time governed these points, and the treaty of commerce concluded between Russia and Turkey, in 1783, contained three articles (XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII,) devoted to these questions.*

The sanitary regulations of Constantinople are not more rigorous or more arbitrary than those of New York or of

*Treaty of commerce of Constantinople, between Russia and Turkey, June 21, 1783.

Marseilles, and cannot, consequently, give rise to any difficulties.

The regulations of the custom-house have been limited with minutest care, and in extended detail, in the numerous treaties of commerce concluded between Turkey on the one hand and the various contracting Powers on the other. As each one of these latter stands, by the expressed provisions of its treaty, on the same footing with the most favored nations, this clause excludes at once both privileges and conditions of inferiority, which would be the consequence of distinctions.

As to the police regulations, they are as follows :

1st. No vessel can navigate the Straits of Dardanelles without a special "firman," given at Constantinople, as arranged for by the Turkish Government. This firman must be shown when passing the Castle of Dardanelles of Asia, which is the residence of the Governor; and as, when the winds are favorable, many vessels wish to avail themselves of such opportunities for passing up the Straits, the Turkish Government provides an agent, who, coming in a canoe carrying the red flag, will accost the vessels, and will simply require an exhibition of the firman, without arresting the progress of the ship, which need only to moderate its speed by a slight lowering of sails. Also, when passing the point of Anadoli Kavack in Asia, when running into the Black Sea, every vessel must slacken speed, by lowering sail, in order to pass, or at least to show its "firman" to an agent of the Turkish Government, who will also there meet vessels, approaching them in a canoe bearing the red flag. A moderate compensation of five Turkish piasters (about one franc twenty centimes) is required from each vessel.

America, as well as the other contracting Powers, recognized the right of the Porte to exact these "firmans," for Article XVI of the treaty of 1862 is thus worded :

"The firmans required from American merchant vessels, in their passage through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous, will always be accorded in such manner as to occasion the least possible delay."

2d. The Turkish authorities* do not allow vessels to go through the passage of "Chateau Vieux," (the old castle,) in the Straits of Dardanelles after sun-set; consequently, approaching vessels must, after this hour, stop before arriving between the Castles of Dardanelles, of Europe and of Asia, if they do not wish to expose themselves to a cannonade. Such vessels as are overtaken by night-fall before reaching these castles should anchor in the "Baie des Barbiers," (Barber's Bay,) or at the west of the Chateau of Dardanelles, (of Europe—European Dardanelles,) on the European side, and should there await day-light.

CONCLUSION.

We are led to conclude, from all that precedes, that in all past time foreign war-vessels have been excluded from the Straits of the Black Sea; at first, by virtue of a territorial right, constantly exercised by the Sultans, with the assent of the European Powers; and later, by virtue of the stipulations of the convention of the Straits," and of the treaty of Paris, accepted with one consent by the great Powers, with the double design of guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and of insuring a safeguard to European peace. Such is the interpretation given to these two contracts in all subsequent negotiations. Will it be said that the United States has never signed a political treaty with Turkey? But when the Cabinet of Washington solicited and obtained from the Porte, in 1830, the same advantages which had been accorded to France in 1740, did not the American Government imply by this fact the acceptance of those restrictions which formed, in some sort, the conditions or corollaries of such concession?

As regards commercial vessels, the Porte has always shown a readiness to remove all causes of hindrance thereto, and to lessen the obstacles which interfere with navigation. Evident and incontestible proofs of this fact have been given in the numerous treaties of commerce which the Turkish Govern-

*Circular of the S. Porte, July 24, 1844.

ment has concluded within the past century, in which all points have been considered and regulated with the most scrupulous attention. If the Porte has transgressed these contracts in any respect, it has been by an excess of indulgence which imperilled her own security.* Whoever will contrast, impartially, the enormous taxes imposed by the Federal Government upon foreign importations with the moderate duties which the Ottoman Government exacts in its treaties, will admit, that if any one has ground for complaint, that party is not, most assuredly, the United States.

Do we not also discover the object of the Kelley proposition? Whatever this may be, should we find ourselves forced to a choice between the false, equivocal, and dangerous policy which this proposition seems to indicate; where interests of natures so different, that they could not be mingled save by a resort to diplomacy, or complications still more weighty, are confused and confounded, whether unintentionally or by design; were we called to choose between this proposition and the course of the American statesmen of 1830, who were so careful to exclude from their treaty all that could call in question its strictly commercial character—while we do not wish to impugn the intention of the honorable Representative from Pennsylvania—we should not hesitate to avow our preference for the policy, at once wise, loyal, and dignified, of Van Buren, Clay, and John Quincy Adams.

The truth concerning the insurrection in Crete.

On the 21st of July last, the honorable Mr. Sumner presented to Congress the following resolutions,* which was adopted:

1. “*Resolved*, That the people of the United States renew the expression of their sympathy with the suffering people of

* Circulars of the S. Porte to the foreign legations, July 4, 1822, Jan. 12, 1853, and Nov. 15, 1862

Crete, to whom they are bound by the ties of a common religion, and by the gratitude due to the Greek race, of which the Cretans are a part; that they rejoice to believe that the sufferings of this interesting people may be happily terminated by a policy of forbearance on the part of the Turkish Government, and they hereby declare their earnest hope that the Turkish Government will listen kindly to this representation, and will speedily adopt such generous steps, as will secure to Crete the much-desired blessings of peace and the advantages of autonomic government.

2. "*Resolved*, That religion, civilization, and humanity, require that the existing contest in Crete should be brought to a close, and to accomplish this result the civilized Powers of the world should unite in friendly influence with the Government of Turkey.

3. "*Resolved*, That it shall be the duty of the President to instruct the minister of the United States at Constantinople to coöperate with the ministers of other Powers in all good offices to terminate the sufferings of the people of Crete; and it shall be the further duty of the President to communicate a copy of these resolutions to the Government of Turkey." *

The difficulty of finding authentic sources of information.

If the people and the interests of Europe are generally understood by the statesmen of the Union, this same cannot be claimed as regards the affairs of the Orient. The few American travellers who have visited these distant regions have been traders, missionaries, or tourists, rather than politicians, and on their return, whether through consciousness of indifference in their hearers, or through hopelessness of eradicating ancient prejudices, they have neglected to communicate to their own countrymen the results of their researches. As to public men, some have disregarded a country which seemed

* Resolutions passed by Congress, July 21, 1868.

to them condemned to perpetual stagnation, while others, for want of leisure, have only studied Turkey as depicted in certain journals and well-known publications, and have imbibed from these sources simply an erroneous idea of a nation which is at this hour in process of transformation and is passing through a pacific revolution. Hence the incertitude and perplexity experienced by sensible and impartial minds, in view of the contradictory reports to which the recent events in Crete have given occasion. Thus also is explained as well the emotion which the insurrection in Crete has produced in this country; an emotion which has expressed itself during the last sessions of Congress by resolutions of sympathy in favor of the Cretans.

It will not, therefore, prove either useless or uninteresting to seek out the truth regarding an insurrection, which has brought forth during the past two years a continued exchange of dispatches between all Governments, and which, notwithstanding, has never been well understood on this side of the ocean. What is the origin and what has been the career of this Cretan people, in whom Congress interests itself, because of their connection with the great Hellenic family? What position have this people occupied in this family? What light does their past history shed upon present events? Whence originated this insurrection? Why prolonged for such length of time? What was its issue? Were the measures relating thereto, which were adopted by other Powers, just and efficacious? What is at this moment the condition of the emigrant Cretans? In what situation do we find the island itself?

Our principal sources of information must be the accounts afforded by eye-witnesses. Still, these witnesses, having been actors as well, in the events under consideration, could not completely divest themselves of bias in their recitals. It is by a comparison of these diverse testimonies, and by contrasting them with the numerous, as well as impartial, documents found in the parliamentary papers, laid before the British Chambers, that we shall accomplish the disengagement of the truth. While we must use extreme caution in our recourse to

the public journals, it would be unjust to ignore them completely; more particularly, when they publish articles so remarkable as that which appeared in the London Times, of date 5th of last September, whose author had "recently visited Crete to see for himself the state of things in the island. This report is an elaborate review of the origin, character, and prospects of this movement, and the result of a careful search after truth, and a patient inquiry into the condition to which the Christian population has been reduced in the half of the island of Crete, where an insurrection has been prolonged for two years."

Crete from heroic times to 1669.

The Island of Crete is traversed in its entire length, from east to west, by a chain of mountains, whose principal spurs, three in number, are the White Mountains (Leuca Ori) in the west; Ida (Psiloriti) in the centre; and the Dicté (Lassiti) in the east. If Ida be the culminating point in this chain, the White Mountains form, without doubt, the most important group. There are found the most abrupt descents, the wildest localities. Branching out from the centre, counter-forts stretch towards the sea, thus dividing this part of the island into deep and isolated valleys. Thus also the interior of the country is shut off from access, save by a winding and narrow defile, like that of Carpi, which leads to Sphakia. Hence, also, table-lands, surrounded by mountainous peaks, as found at Omalos, which can only be reached through the rocky bed of a torrent, or by rugged foot-paths, which border on frightful precipices, and whicheven the mules cannot travel without danger. It is on the inaccessible summits of these White Mountains that the descendants of the primitive population have existed during the past centuries. It is here that we discover the marked characteristics of the Dorian dialect, together with the martial habits, and the jealous, turbulent, and indomitable disposition of the ancient inhabitants. While in the large open valleys of Ida, and throughout the residue of

the island, Greeks and Mussulmen live side by side, we find the abrupt gorges of Sphakia occupied only by Greek villages.

If we connect with the peculiar configuration of the country the fact of the different origins of its first occupants, we shall readily comprehend why these various sections were never, in historic times, united under one government.

It is true, that in the fourteenth century before our era, Minos extended his empire over all the colonies of the Eteo-cretois,* the Pelasges, the Phenecians, and the Hellenes, (Acheans, Eolians, and Dorians,) and by means of his powerful navy, subjected to tribute all the surrounding islands. This was, perhaps, the most brilliant epoch of Crete. With their numerous vessels, the Cretans bore a large share in the Trojan war: that piratical expedition, which the imagination of the poets has clothed in heroic colors, as it transforms a simple quarry into a wonderful labyrinth.

"Next, eighty barks the Cretan king commands,
Of Gnossus, Lyctus, and Gortyna's bands;
And those who dwell where Rhytion's dome arises,
Or white Lycastus glitters to the skies,
Or where, by Phœstus, silver Jordan runs,
Crete's hundred cities pour forth all her sons;
These marched, Idomeneus, beneath thy care
And Merion, dreadful as the God of War."†

When the great painter of the *Odyssey* pictures to us his hero, on his arrival at Eumea, he represents him as announcing to Ulysses (the type of unscrupulous ability) that he comes from Crete:

"Know, then, I came
From sacred Crete, and from a sire of fame;
Me Mars inspired to turn the foe to flight,
And tempt the secret ambush of the night;
But works of peace my soul disdained to bear,
The rural labor and domestic care.
To raise the mast, the missile dart to wing,
And send swift arrows from the bounding string,
Were arts the gods made grateful to my mind."

* Strabo, liv. x, ch. 4; Thucydides, liv. I, 4, 5, 8, 11.

† Homer's *Iliad*, II, v. 654; Homer's *Odyssey*, XIV, v. 217; Homer's *Odyssey*, XIX, v. 179. Translated by Pope.

Following events contrast strangely with this resplendency of promise, and Crete, which seemed destined—judging from its numerous population, the development of its naval power, and the wisdom of its constitution, which served as a model to Lycurgus—to play an important *role* in the history of Greece, falls suddenly into an inferior position, and remains a stranger to those glorious contests of the continental Greeks against Asia.

While, during the fourth and fifth century before our era, the empire of the ocean passed to the Athenians, under Aristides, Themistocles, and Cimon; while victorious Greece, in her turn, bore the brunt of the war in the Orient, the Cretans, who had refused to aid their brothers, and who took no part in the Medicean struggles, distracted by internal quarrels, spent their powers ignobly in civil warfare.* During these fratricidal contests, where victory rested with those who dared most shamelessly to violate their oaths, sworn at the altars of their gods, all Hellenic patriotism disappeared, together with the ancient customs and laws of the people, while at the same time the most cynical perfidy and the most unbridled avarice were developed. Polybe,† one of the most judicious and reliable historians of antiquity dwells at length upon these civil discords, which had become perpetual in the island, and upon the atrocious acts of vengeance inspired by implacable hatred, such as the destruction of Lyctos and Apollonia, and also upon that spirit of adventure which led the Cretans, being good archers and great adepts in ambuscade warfare, to sell their services to the highest bidder—to Nabis, to Philippe, to Antiochus, to Mithridates.

When the Athenians ceased to act as guardians of navigation, the Cretans associated themselves with the pirates of

* Strabo, Athenæus Deipnosophista, book iv, ch. 22; v. 10; ix; xiv, 24. Herodotus, liv. i, ch. 2, 65, 173; liv. iv, ch. 151; vii, 169.

† Polybe, liv. iv, ch. 8, 20, 53, 54; liv. v, ch. 14, 53, 79; liv. vi, ch. 43, 45, etc.; liv. vii, ch. 12, 15; liv. viii, ch. 17, 18, 19, 20; liv. xiii, ch. 4, 5, 8; liv. xxiii, 15; liv. xxv, ch. 36; liv. xxvii, 16; liv. xxix, ch. 4; liv. xxxi, ch. 1; liv. xxxiii, ch. 9, 12, 13.

Cilicia, and roamed the Mediterranean.* Rome, which at one time was well-nigh threatened with starvation by reason of these corsairs, sent Metellus, in 67, to put an end to their robberies, and to make conquest of the island. This conquest brought to Crete† the termination of its unhappy dissensions; this it was which led a modern voyager to say, "I see no country in the ancient world whose conquest secured more advantages than that of Crete, principally because its intestine wars have ceased for many centuries to ravage the island, while little by little the remembrances even of the hatreds and bloody rivalries of former days are being extinguished."

The Cretans, however, preserved their detestable reputation. Polybe cites this proverb: "It is allowable to Cretanize with a Cretan; that is, to lie to a liar." Elsewhere he speaks of a bargain between two traitors, as a *Cretan deliberation*. Cicero says of the Cretans:‡ "*Cretes latrocinari honestum putant.*" (Cretans consider it honest to be robbers.)

St. Paul did not hold them in higher estimation.§ He writes: "*Cretenses semper mendaces, malæ bestiæ, ventres pigri. Testimonium hoc verum est quam ab causam increpa illos durè, ut sani sint in fide.*" "The Cretans are alway liars, evil beasts, slow bellies." This witness is true. Wherefore rebuke them sharply, that they may be sound in the faith."

The Roman peace in Crete lasted until the time of Arabian domination. In 823 the Arabs, masters of the Mediterranean, disembarked on this island, and made around their camp a deep moat, called *Kandak*, which gave name to the city of Candia, and even to the island. The Greeks recaptured it in 961; then it passed, after the Fourth Crusade, in 1204, to the Venetians, who held it until 1669, notwithstanding frequent revolts. At this time it was said "the inhabitants of this island are numerous, and, according to the testimony of

* Velleius Paterculus, liv. ii, ch. 34. Florus, liv. 14, ch. 7.

† L'île de Crète, Souvenirs of Travel, by G. Perrot. (Paris)

‡ Cicero's "Republic," liv. iii, ch. 6.

§ St. Paul's epistle to Titus, ch. I, verses 12 and 13.

the Venetians, their character is inconstant and perfidious.”* Finally, in 1669, Mahomet II, after a memorable siege of twenty-five years, captured Candia from the Republic of Venice, and submitted it definitively to his own government.

Crete from 1669 to 1866.

Under Mussulman domination the Cretans enjoyed, like the other Greeks, very liberal municipal franchises. The people elected their mayor, who himself assessed the taxes; his action being subject to the inspection of the Council of the Province; and even the Sphakiotes remained, as they had been under Venetian rule, almost independent, in their mountain homes. But this was not enough; they still wished to control the country, and to this end seized every occasion for disturbing the peace of the island. In 1770 Catherine the Great of Russia excited here, as in Greece, in the interests of her policy, uprisings, which accomplished only the desolation of the country; for on the conclusion of peace she quickly abandoned to the resentment of the Turks her too credulous allies, whose independence she had proclaimed, as she did that of the Crimea and of Poland. The war of Hellenic independence presented to the Cretans an occasion too tempting to be allowed to escape unimproved. Their brothers of the continent sent them arms and leaders, among others Tombarri; but he found as much difficulty in allaying the discords of the Cretans as in combatting the Turks. Gordon, an historian of this revolution, relates as follows:† “Tombarri bent his attention towards appeasing the dissensions of the different Christian tribes, which at the moment of his arrival wore the aspect of civil war. The insolence and unbounded rapine of the people of Sphakia having wearied out the patience of the other Cretans, and provoked them to resistance, two or three mountaineers, conducting themselves

* Sismondi's Italian Republics, Liv. xx.

† Gordon's History of the Greek Revolution, (London,) book III., ch. 3.

like determined robbers, in a village of the district of Mylopotamos, were shot in the street, and as, in conformity with immemorial usage, their blood cried for vengeance, the warriors of Sphakia assembled at Comitados, designing to ravage Mylopotamos with fire and sword. All the tribes of the lower country, making common cause, prepared to withstand their aggression. A Captain George Tyndaros, with 800 men of St. Basil, seized the intermediate passes. More of Rhetymo and Mylopotamos collected in arms, and the Khivites of Canea threatened to invade Sphakia in the absence of the military population. Compelled to renounce their design, the Sphakiots talked of submitting to the Turks, and thereby precipitating the ruin of the island. However, they did not at once go so far, but adopted a resolution of remaining at home and lending no assistance to any canton that might be in danger." But in 1824 these rivalries were pushed so far that the Sphakiots betrayed their brothers, and caused the island to fall again into the power of the Turks. The historian before quoted continues:

"In the spring of 1824, the affairs of the Cretan insurgents suffered a total wreck. The Turks and Egyptians, reckoned at 20,000 combatants, left their winter-quarters in February, and fell upon the western provinces, while Tombarrilay sick at Vaffe, and the Sphakiots carried their malignity to such a pitch, as to open separate negotiations, chiefly with a view of gratifying their revenge, and punishing the contumacy of the Katomerites, who would not be their humble subjects. Many of the best soldiers of those districts, which had previously laid down their arms, rallied round the Harmost, but he dispaired of making an efficient stand, and having intercepted a correspondence in which the Sphakiots engaged to betray him into the hands of the Egyptian general, he hastily got on board his schooner, at Leutra, to secure himself from their treachery." *

These same Sphakiots who refused to battle for their com-

* Gordon, b. IV, ch. 1.

mon country essayed to wage war in an interest far less noble, and solely for their own profit. As the demands of naval warfare rendered a surveillance far more difficult, they judged the opportunity favorable for a return of their former piratical practises. Retiring into the fortified Island of Grabuse, at the extreme end of the Gulf of Kissamos, on the western side, they commenced again to prey not only on Turkish ships, but on the merchant vessels of all nations.* In order to reëstablish security in the archipelago, it was found necessary to send the English squadron, in the month of February, 1828, to locate itself before this nest of marauders, to destroy their fortifications, and to force them to evacuation of the island, which had served them as a refuge. The treaties of 1833 gave the Island of Crete to Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt, who restored order and safety.

In 1840, the Greeks, taking advantage of the embarrassment of Turkey, caused by the revolt of Mehemet Ali, and believing the auspicious moment to have arrived for the reopening of the eastern question, induced an uprising in Crete; but the European powers promptly put a check on these ambitious plans, and in 1841 returned Crete to Turkey. During these times, the island was ably governed by Mustapha Pacha, at first in the name of the Viceroy of Egypt, afterwards in the name of the Sultan, up to 1850. Under his son, Vely Pacha, the Candiots again took arms against the Turkish Government, and obtained all that could be conceded to them, namely, the right to carry arms, on condition they should not be used against their sovereign. This was the first engagement, which they violated in 1866. From 1862 until the outbreak of the revolt, the island was governed by Ismaïl Pacha, a Greek by descent; a man of feeble and undecided character, who erred in allowing himself to be circumvented and betrayed by avaricious and intriguing Greeks, with whom he shared too confidently the cares of his administration.

* Perrot, already quoted.

Griefs of the Cretans.

We must first remark, that this movement of 1866 is neither a national nor a religious insurrection, like that of 1821. It is simply a question of taxation and of administrative reforms, which served as pretexts to a new resort to arms. As early as April, 1866, the English consul at Canea,* Mr. Dickson, mentioned a certain discontent among the population, and thus reproached the government :

1. With the faulty system of rent, of taxes, whence results the payment of more than a tenth, while the collection of the tax gives rise to vexatious measures.

2. With the intervention of the Governor General in the elections of the Dèmogèrontie.

3. With the deplorable custom of seizing and throwing into prison the parents or friends of a criminal who has escaped justice.

4. With the grievous delays which suspend decisions in civil and criminal affairs.

In their petition to the Queen of England, as well as in that addressed to the Sultan, the Cretans complained that they were overburdened with taxation ; that they had no roads, no schools, no hospitals, no liberty of worship ; in a word, that they were the slaves of another race. It would be but too easy a task to expose the exaggerations and the fallacy of these recriminations. Some are ungrounded, such as that relative to taxation, which is less in Crete than in any other province of the Ottoman empire ; and that in regard to freedom of religious worship, which is nowhere more complete than in Turkey. The other causes of protest were strangely magnified, and reflected on persons rather than institutions. In fact, the Turkish Government is generally reproached with *inertia* and negligence, rather than with arbitrariness. Ismaïl Pasha, in particular, by the

* Correspondence respecting the disturbances in Crete, presented to Parliament 1866-67.

avowal even of the Mussulmen themselves, did not avail himself of his official powers to their full extent, and the abuses committed in his name by his subalterns rendered him very unpopular, and made the people more urgent for the required reforms.

But, on the other hand, were the Cretans very sincere in their protestations? If so, how shall we explain the contradictions which appear in their language, as well as in their conduct? On the 14th of May, in their petition to the Sultan, they say:* “We shall never cease to hope for an improvement in our condition under the powerful ægis of the Imperial Government.” This hope, however, cannot have been so enduring, since, on the morrow, 15th of May, in their petition to the Queen of England, they express themselves as follows:

“Long experience has proved, that from the manner in which our island is governed, all improvement and all advancement are impossible for this wretched country. We, consequently, entreat your Majesty, and their Majesties the sovereigns of the two other protecting Powers of the Greek nation, to deign to excuse our one wish, viz: Union with our brethren of Greece.”

Whence comes it, that at the very moment when they pretended to seek a peaceful redress for their wrongs, even while *directing* their address to the Sultan, and being necessarily as yet unadvised of the reception which might be accorded to their demands, they were securing arms and ammunition from Greece? Mr. Dickson wrote in effect, on the 14th of May, to Lord Lyons:

“There is every reason to apprehend that several boatloads of gunpowder and other ammunitions of war have been surreptitiously landed on this coast.”

If they were really animated with the pacific sentiments which they claim in their first manifesto, how happens it, that when apprized of the arrival of Mustapha Pacha, who came

* Parliamentary Papers, cited above.

as commissioner extraordinary, charged to examine into their grievances and to insure their redress, they at once precipitated the commencement of hostilities? "On learning the arrival of Mustapha Pacha, the insurgents determined to attack the Turkish garrison in Canea."

Why did the assembly of Cretans, by a decree bearing date August 21, 1866, hasten to abolish Turkish domination September 2, in the island, and to proclaim its annexation to Greece? Why, at a little later date, on September 9th, were the troops of Shahan Pacha surprised and forced to capitulate, if the Cretans had not from the outset resolved to free themselves by force?

We can no longer, then, be deceived by these mock petitions, nor mistake as to the true intentions of the Cretans; and if, on the one hand, we find reason to upbraid the Porte with too great tardiness of response as well as of action—with having preserved, in the form of its replies, the threatening rigor of another epoch; and, above all, with never giving credence to the serious and important nature of this movement—it is, on the other hand, certain, judging from all the documents which emanated from the Ottoman Government, that it was always disposed, as is witnessed by the representatives of France and England, to redress any serious cause of discontent among the Cretans, and to accord to them the most liberal reforms.

But the Turkish Government was not deceived when affirming that this agitation originated in foreign instigations, and that it had in view the withdrawal of Crete from Ottoman control, whether with design to create of it an independent principality or of annexing it to Greece.

The language of the journals of Athens; the attitude of the Hellenic cabinet; and, it is well to add, the conduct of certain consuls at Canea, justified but too surely these assertions; and Mr. Erskine, in making a report to his government, on the 13th of August, 1866, concerning the excitement which existed in Athens, found reason to say:

"The Greek Government and the Greek people are endeavoring by fictitious means to get up an excitement abroad about

the Eastern question." We must, then, distinguish the apparent pretext from the actual motives. The Saturday Review, says :

"The Sultan and the ministers were probably not unwilling to redress abuses, but they were fully aware that the pretexts of the insurrection had little to do with the motives and purposes of its leaders. The war commenced with the transmission of an address to the great Powers, issued simultaneously with a formal petition to the Sultan ; nor could clearer proof be given that the demand for administrative reform was wholly conventional and insincere."

Powerless and factitious character of the insurrection.

Without making an attempt to enter into the details of a struggle which resembled partisan strife rather than regular warfare, we shall content ourselves with the establishment of the fact, that the insurrection had none of the characteristics which constitute national war : neither unity of purpose, patriotic self-abnegation among the leaders, nor unanimity of action among the citizens. Many families were detained unwillingly in the camp of the rebels and led into the movement by intimidation. Mr. Dickson wrote from Canea, on the 22d September, 1866, that Hadji Ghiorghi, sent by Mustapha Pacha to the camp of the insurgents to deliver to them his proclamation, stated, "that while dissensions exist in the insurgent camp, many Cretan Greek families, being detained by force on the mountains, are exposed to many privations, and therefore desired to submit."

In the month of January, the minister of Prussia, at Athens, received the report of a german Garibaldian, who had gone to Crete to fight, but who had hastened to return. He says :

"On the night of the 19th-20th December, our outposts suddenly gave the alarm, and we were so surrounded, that we

only fought our way through with considerable loss. Colonel Janiserei also was in the same position, and had sustained heavy losses. On the 20th, the Turks advanced with a force of 15,000 men, and we were driven higher and higher into the mountains, until all four colonels were assembled in the village of Costo-Yeraca. Our united force amounted to from 500 to 600 men. As this force was too insignificant to offer any prolonged resistance to the Turks, and as the Cretans were not sufficiently active in their own cause, Coroneos told the leaders, that if within a given time they did not get together a force of 1,500 men, he would reëmbark with his people. But as, after the stipulated delay, only 200 men appeared, Coroneos, Bizandios, and Janiserei determined to march along the coast, in order to embark as soon as might be practicable. Before their departure, however, Zimbrakaki called the people together and addressed them, asking who was disposed to remain with him to carry on the revolution? About 150 men answered his appeal, the rest marched off on the 24th of December, from Costo-Yeraca along the shore."

Nothing demonstrates more clearly the lack of enthusiasm among the Cretan people in seconding those who had imposed themselves upon them as their liberators. The character of these leaders was little calculated to secure to them the sympathies of the soldiery. Incapacity, jealousy, rivalry—treason even—are the principal traits which we discover on every page as we glance over the collection of *parliamentary* papers and the recitals of eye-witnesses.*

Different causes which prolonged the insurrection.

But it will, perhaps, be questioned, if the insurrection was neither religious nor national—if it had not deep roots in the soil—how is it that it was prolonged for two years? The causes

* "Roughing it in Crete;" H. Skinner: London.

* "The Cretan Insurrection," by M. Jules Ballot, French Volunteer in Crete." Paris, 1868.

which sustained the rebellion for so long a time were very numerous and very varied.

First was the humanity of the Sultan, who, in the commencement of the conflict, generously returned to Athens the volunteer Greeks who fell into the hands of his army.* It is well known how these volunteers were received at Pirea by the populace. Moreover, if he had yielded to the solicitations of the Mussulmen Cretans, who are all warriors, and who offered to arm 30,000 men at their own expense, the revolt would have been far sooner quieted or subdued. The Sultan, however, did all in his power to avoid civil war; he preferred to accomplish himself that undertaking which, if confided to the Mussulmen of the island, might have rendered the strife more implacable and reconciliation more difficult. The humanity of Mustapha Pacha is also shown in that, after the victory of Vaffe, being master of Prosnero, he did not avail himself of the defeat of his enemies by marching upon the very hearthstone of the insurrection, but allowed a *peculiar* opportunity for its suppression to escape him, acting on his conviction that the discouraged bands would disperse of their own accord, and that it would be useless to ravage and imbrue with blood that island where he had himself passed so many years, and where he still owns large properties. Circumstances of situation have also proved insurmountable obstacles to the strongest governments. Crete is not a province into which an army can enter, as in level country, like Poland or Hungary. It is a detached camp, surrounded by rocks and inaccessible defiles. Crete is not like Hungary and Poland, in neighborhood of allies, devoted to the sovereign power, always ready to bring succour thereto, whether by invasion of the usurped province or by giving asylum to troops which have been dispersed by insurrection, as did Prussia for Russia during the Polish insurrection, in despite of the representations of Europe. Crete, on the contrary, is neighbor to a State which desires the

* Europe in 1867, by the Duke de Valmy, former secretary of ambassade to Constantinople; Paris.

triumph of the insurrectionists, and which sustains them in face of the law of nations by enrollments and aid of every kind.

Let us add to this the peculiar habits of Cretan warfare. While the volunteers coming from abroad were well enough disposed to meet the Turks in open field, the natives refused to fight unless behind shelter, whether of light entrenchments, improvised at the moment of action, or of the rocks of their mountains, in gorges, or in defiles. In this fact we recognize the Cretans of Homer and Polybe.

We should seek in vain in history for a position similar to that of the Turkish army in Crete. Italy has employed 80,000 men in the Neapolitan provinces, since their annexation, in the pursuit of the brigands, and she has not yet succeeded in their extirpation; and notwithstanding the brigands of Calabria receive no assistance from without and Italy is mistress of the sea.

There remained for Turkey a recourse: to blockade. But what a blockade! The landings of the Island of Crete are not only inaccessible, save to pirates—which fact renders surveillance difficulty—but, moreover, it becomes impossible, from the constant presence of foreign war and merchant-vessels, which transgress with impunity the lines of blockade. May it not be averred, that certain of these war-vessels were there solely for the purpose of embarrassing the movements of the Turkish fleet, and of facilitating the passage of Greek blockade-runners? Find an American admiral capable of assuming the success of a similar blockade, without subjecting himself each day to complications like that of the *Trent*!—find an instance of insurrection subdued, under such exceptional circumstances as those presented in Crete;—and then the remonstrances addressed to Turkey will not be without foundation. “Even when both parties were so well matched in seamanship as in America, it took a long time to establish an efficient blockade. How much more, in a case where one side knows every nook and corner of the island; while the officers, at any rate, of the other are at the best times fair-weather

sailors.”* Let us say, moreover, that the greater part of the Turkish squadron, being employed in victualling the expeditionary corps, it would have been for this reason alone impossible to them to establish a vigorous blockade.

But that which most contributed to the maintenance of the insurrection was the material and moral aid which it received from abroad. From Athens came the instigations which fomented it; from Athens and from Syra proceeded the succour of every kind which fed it. They were the journals of Athens which spread the report, in the midst of the embarrassments created in Europe by the German wars, that the Eastern question was about to open anew, and that the hour for accomplishing the “*grand idea*” had sounded. In all its diplomatic correspondence the Ottoman Government has affirmed that this insurrection was the work of foreign intriguers, and it has made this declaration with such energy and persistence, that it must needs have more than one proof of such fact in its hands. This conviction was entertained from the beginning by the British ambassador at Constantinople. Lord Lyons wrote on the 12th of August, 1866, to Mr. Dickson, consul at Canea:

“It is very confidentially stated here that the movements of the Christian population have been the result of foreign intrigues. You will, of course, avoid all unnecessary interference in the unhappy dispute which has arisen.”

And the correspondent of the Times said on the same subject:

“How the strife has been prolonged; how much of it arose from spontaneous Cretan aspirations; how much was owing to Hellenic’s suggestions and assistance, we have made sufficiently clear from beginning to end. The insurrection was Greek and Russian, rather than Cretan. By the Cretan outbreak the signal for dismemberment was given at the same time that the first blow was struck. But the settlement of

* Correspondence of the London Times, January 11, 1868.

German affairs at Prague baffled all those shallow designs. It became evident that the downfall of Turkey, in the midst of a profound peace, was not to be compassed by mere intrigues. The Cretan-patriot insurrection degenerated into thieves' war, and battles ceased to be fought by Athens and Corfu telegraphs."

The eye-witnesses of this war did not fail to discover in it the hand of Greece and Russia. A young French volunteer, Mr. Jules Ballot, who fought in Crete in the ranks of the insurgents, and who on his return published his impressions, said as follows:

"Oh, how many times, when beholding this good and noble Cretan people, so simple and unsuspecting, without bread, without shelter; wandering on the shores and in the mountains; walking with bare feet on the rocks in the torrents; shivering under their rags, which they gatheted and hugged round their limbs; chilled by the northern winds and the frosts of the White Mountains;—how many times I have cursed the insurrection and its authors—Russia and Greece. Russia, whose pitiless policy marches to its goal by trampling down nations, without one unquiet thought of the wretched ones crushed in its passage; Russia, which hopes some day to profit by the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, and which extends its hand, red with Polish blood, to the unsuspecting Cretans, who seize it, and allow themselves to be dragged to their own ruin. Greece, that nation of ambitious children, who wish to be great before they are wise—who wish to crush Turkey to conquer Constantinople and the Orient before they form an army; before they have found a capable minister; before they know how to govern themselves;—Greece, which makes herself the humble servant of Russia, and forgets that when the hour of partition arrives, if it ever does come, Russia, like the lion, will remind her of the law, that the "strongest is best," or might is right."

Greece proper, and its administration.

The General Assembly of the Cretans, in the petition which it addressed, on the 15th of May, 1866, to the protecting Powers, sought the annexation of the island to Greece: "Whereas Crete, if united to Greece, would confer great advantages on the whole Greek race, and would be able to embark on a system of civilization." What is the civilization which Greece could offer to the Cretans? Is Greece well prepared to play in the Orient that *role* to which the partisans of the *grand idea* believe her destined? Has she ameliorated her own administration, and her financial and agricultural condition, since her enfranchisement? In a word, is she of age, and able to exist without protection of other Powers?

When Greece, after the battle of Navarino, was suddenly wrenched from the hands of Turkey, her entire population was under arms, yet she had no army; she was without finances, without administration, without legislation, without agriculture, without organization of any sort. All was intrigue, revolt, confusion, misery. Capo d'Istria undertook with courage and ability to create all that was lacking. He labored to establish an army and a national bank; he organized courts, administration, public education, and even opened an agricultural school; but because he protected the country people with determination against the cupidity of the soldiery, he was considered a tyrant, and was assassinated. However, he had not dealt with a sufficiently firm hand, since this odious act of vengeance was preceded by troubles such as that at Magne and the insurrection of Hydra.

In the month of August, 1832, Greece again fell into anarchy. The administration was in the hands of a commission, which exercised its powers only at Nauplie, under protection of a French detachment; while in the interior, partisan chiefs, restless under discipline, jealous of all superiority, occupied and ransacked through the provinces under the pretext of applying the *local system*. The adventurous feats of a long war had inspired them with an aversion to the peaceable occupa-

tions of agriculture, with a distaste for the regular habits of the domestic fireside, with a love of that luxury which is audaciously, but easily acquired. This little country tried, during twelve years, five congresses, two constitutions, and we know not how many executive powers, without being able to conquer the spirit of rivalry which devoured it, or to erect a social structure. In despair of success, she then sought from a German prince that which she had been unable to secure for herself, the allaying of civil discords and the establishment of regular power. Thus the incapacity of the Greeks for self-government was the determining cause of the foundation of the Hellenic monarchy.

The protocol of May 7, 1832, confided to the young son of the king of Bavaria a crown, which one of the wisest princes of Europe, Leopold of Coburg, the future king of Belgium, had despised or judged too weighty. In his proclamation, the new king did not conceal from his people some severe truths. "Your fields," he said, "are uncultivated, your industry is hardly born, your commerce is entirely paralyzed, despotism has been replaced only by anarchy, which lashes you like a horrible scourge! All that the love of country, by its noble sacrifices, had acquired *for* you, has been ravished *from* you by discord and the most shameful egotism." The finances were so embarrassed, that the protocol stipulated a loan, at the same time that it announced the establishment of the throne. The national troops were so demoralized by lack of discipline, that the protecting Powers required the new kingdom to hire a body of foreign soldiers.

Even in 1843, King Otho, who entertained a moderate esteem for his subjects, confided the principal departments of his administration to Bavarians, and following the example of Capo d'Istria, endeavored to fortify the central power, constantly menaced by insurrections. The Greeks accused him of tyranny, inaugurated the revolution of 1843, and forced him to give them the constitution of 1844, one of the wisest and most liberal which has ever been conceded to any people. Was Greece satisfied? No. In 1861 the irritation against the "*tyrant*" was so great, that a young Athenian attempted

to assassinate the queen, and what is still more sad is the fact, that all the youth of Athens sympathized with him and exalted him as a hero. He was with great difficulty condemned by his judges, and the "tyrant" granted him his life, with that same indulgence which he always showed to the authors of the many conspiracies plotted against his throne. One day, at the beginning of 1862, worn out by the clamors of the opposition, the king called Admiral Canaris, one of his officers, and commissioned him with the organization of a cabinet. The hero of the war of independence could not accomplish this end, and it was evident that the turbulent opposition which ceaselessly threatened the king, and culminated in his overthrow, was composed simply of bigoted and egotistical spirits, incapable of conceiving a politic plan, and who sought only in revolution an occasion for making profit of public interests.

What, however, are the financial and agricultural conditions of Greece; those criteria of the prosperity of a nation?

In 1838, Greece shook off her financial obligations to France, and in 1843 she ceased also to pay the interest of her debt to other Powers. Much more; in 1854 she threatened with complications, by an attack on Turkey, those allied Powers which had created her. This tried too sorely the patience of the allies. They first occupied Pirea during the war, and on evacuation named, in accordance with Russia, a commission charged with inquiring into the resources of Greece, and with ascertaining what means she had for payment of her debts. This commission, which was in session from 1857 to 1859, and the result of whose labors was communicated to the British chambers in 1861, brought to light all the corruptions of the Hellenic administration, and proved that Greece had borrowed successively 5,000,000 piastres in 1822; 800,000 pounds sterling in 1823; 2,000,000 pounds sterling in 1825; that the debt contracted in 1832, with other Powers, will be increased in 1870 to 120,000,000 of francs; that in 1845 Greece owed more than two millions of florins to Bavaria, which had advanced this money to her; that the disorder of her finances proceeded from an absolute absence of any degree of control; and,

finally, that the Hellenic Government could, without disorganizing its service, give to the three Powers interested a positive guarantee for the fulfillment of the obligations which it had contracted towards them, and could devote annually the sum of one million of drachmas towards the discharge of a duty which it should never have failed to meet.

In Greece agriculture is neglected and despised, because the partial assessment of taxes discourages the farmer; because the national domain being unlimited, *private* property also is for this very reason unsettled and undetermined; because there are no roads, no security, no ameliorations; because, in fine, those who have any resources assemble in the cities, send their children to universities, seek governmental positions in preference to all others, "and despise the peasantry, just as the Roman citizens despised the *Pagani*."* Greece is still obliged to import grain by the Black sea for the subsistence of her people, "while extensive tracts of good land remain uncultivated immediately beyond the mountains that overlook the sea. This arises in great part from the want of roads." Whence comes this disgust of the Greeks for agriculture, that is to say, for one of the most fruitful sources of national wealth; for that which in other days made the grandeur of Rome; for that which constitutes one of the principal elements of the prosperity of the American Republic? Whence comes this distaste, if not from those social imperfections with which the Greeks have been so often reproached by their orators and their historians, and which still manifest themselves to the travellers of our own day? "The Greek people love passionately liberty, equality, and their country; but they are undisciplined, jealous, egotistical, unscrupulous, and averse to manual labor."† One of the most curious documents emanating from the pretended Provisional Government of Crete, is that addressed to President Johnson, in which it implores American mediation in favor of Crete, the *cradle of Jupiter and Minos*." We fail to perceive upon

* Saturday Review, January 11, 1868.

† Edmund About; *Cotemporary Greece*: Paris.

what ground these mythological souvenirs should affect Mr. Johnson; but it is a myth which Greece might call to mind with profit to herself. As regards Crete, a poetic legend relates that Ceres gave birth to Plutus, god of wealth, in a field which had been three times upturned by the ploughshare. It would be impossible to clothe in more poetic colors a grander principle of social economy.

What benefit accrued to Greece from the change in her constitution and dynasty in 1863? We have seen the difficulty in Greece is not that institutions are lacking to the people, but the man is lacking to the institution.

Placed in the severe alternative of incurring unpopularity, or of declaring himself the servitor of the *grand idea*, the new and young king, leaning on Russia, did not hesitate to launch Greece into adventures. From the outbreak of the insurrection he disclosed the degree of his good faith or sincerity. On the 15th of May, 1866, the General Assembly of the Cretans united in a petition to the protecting powers, asking the annexation of the island to Greece; and three months later, in an interview with the British minister, Mr. Erskine, the King of Greece feigned ignorance of this demand.* The king replied that he was not "even aware that the persons now in a state of semi-insurrection had gone so far as that." While he permitted his subjects in open day to organize expeditions for running the blockade and sustaining the insurrection, he always played the same farce.

"The Greek Government has always asserted with confidence that it has not violated those principles of international law which ought to regulate the intercourse of a Christian and Greek State with a Mussulman and Ottoman neighbor. The Greeks maintain that blockade-running by armed cruisers, fitted out by a company receiving a large subvention from the Greek Government,† is not a violation of neutrality; and that sending officers of the Greek army to command the insurgents and regiments of volunteers to assist them are

* Parliamentary Papers.

† London Times, January 11, 1868.

not acts of hostility of which the Ottoman Government has a right to complain; that the invasion of Epirus and Thessaly last spring was the consequence of the natural growth of an aspiring State, and only indicate that those provinces ought to be annexed to the Hellenic kingdom, in order to make it sufficiently large to be worth governing well."

The King of Greece has already begun to realize the natural fruits of this condemnable policy. The most sacred principles of honesty and justice are never transgressed with impunity. "The Hellenic Government, for two years past, "has become more and more demoralized by the necessity "of overlooking secret action of officers and officials, and "deteriorating the moral influence and the material strength "of the Greek nation."* Happy will King George be if he does not yet expiate more severely the cruel deception practised on the unbridled ambition of his subjects. Would we know the cost to Greece of the Cretan insurrection in 1867? A Greek journal, the *Ethnophylax*, shall be our authority on this point, and will reveal to us the national wounds.†

While the Government has never before demanded from the Greek people more than twenty-five millions of drachmas, it has received in 1867—

From the revenues of the current year.....	27,500,000 drachmas
From arrears of duties of 1866.....	4,500,000 "
By a loan of thirty-eight millions, which Minister Commoudouros has been authorized to contract for military preparations.....	10,254,000 "

Which makes a total for the expenses of this single year of 42,254,000 drachmas

"In order to reach this figure, the taxes of the country have been greatly augmented. Several communities, moreover, have been subjected to additional charges for the entertainment of the Cretan refugees, whose number reaches sixty thousand. In this cause Minister Commoudouros has disbursed seventeen millions more than the amount of revenue

* London Times, same correspondence.

† *Ethnophylax*, quoted by London Times, February 24, 1868.

in ordinary years." "It is not true," adds this journal, "that twenty millions have been squandered this year, in order to serve the interests of a party rather than the progress of the *grand idea*. Our war-vessels rot in our ports; the army, augmented to an unreasonable degree, rests inactive, and lies as a weight on the war department; the burden of taxation is increased in proportion; brigandage, encouraged by impunity, is more flourishing than ever; corruption is everywhere; and bankruptcy has become imminent."

Such is the pitiable *regime* which has borne heavily on the Ionian (Ioniennes) islands since England ceded them to Greece, and which has ground them to the point of regret for British domination. Such is the unenviable situation which would be imposed on Crete by its annexation to the Hellenic kingdom. Was not the London cabinet justified in its repression of these projects of annexation, resting as it did on these considerations. Lord Clarendon wrote to Lord Lyons on the 2d of July, 1866:

"Her Majesty's Government consider that the condition and prospects of the Ionian island ought to deter the Cretans from wishing to be united to Greece;" and Mr. Erskine wrote, on his part, to his Government, on the 18th of August, of the same year: "But even if the three Powers were disposed to declare, that by her misrule Turkey had forfeited her right to the possession of Crete, there would be but little inducement to intrust the future destinies of that island to a State which has shown so little aptitude, as Greece has hitherto done, to introduce a better system of administration than that which has been the occasion of the present insurrection."*

Intervention of diplomacy in the Cretan insurrection.

The intervention of diplomacy in favor of the Cretans was not among the least of the encouragements extended to the

* Parliamentary Papers.

insurrection. It is matter of remark, also, that this intervention was eagerly solicited, first by Greece and then by Russia. Mr. Delyanni first made this suggestion to Mr. de Moustier, French ambassador at Constantinople; who replied to him, "that the conduct of the Greek consul, and some other consuls in Crete; had, in his opinion, rendered it extremely difficult for France and England to take, at this moment, any steps in favor of the Christians in the island."* This was on the 15th of August, 1866. On the 29th, the English cabinet learned that General Ignatieff had proposed to Constantinople the appointment of a commission of inquiry, "with a view to the removal of any well-founded grounds of complaint which might exist on the part of the population." On the other hand, England refused absolutely to participate in any act which could cast suspicion on the principle of neutrality, which she proclaimed at the outset; and we should render her justice to add, that she remained invariably faithful to this principle during the entire course of negotiations. France took ground at first with England; but from the month of November, 1866, her vacillations commenced. In December she was in accord with Russia in demanding the annexation; then, startled herself at view of the precipice towards which she was gliding, she signed, on the 29th of October, 1867, the identical document by which the Powers refused negotiations with the Porte, and declared themselves disengaged from all responsibility.

Let us see now what remedies they essayed to apply to the evil; what solution they proposed of the Cretan question.

This was, at first, the cession of the island to Greece, which could readily have been accomplished by actual forces, if the war of 1866 had been prolonged and extended through Europe; but which they were compelled, by the prompt reëstablishment of peace, to compass by diplomatic measures. But the Powers could not agree. Now it was Austria which held aloof from negotiations; again it was England which refused

* Parliamentary Papers.

to exercise any pressure on the Porte, in a case where the propositions of the European cabinets might meet refusal; Turkey, on her part, repelled with energy and dignity all such overtures.

Moreover, those who had accepted such a solution, without a second thought, afterwards hesitated the more to sustain it, in proportion as they saw the disorder and anarchy to which Greece itself was a prey. Among the foreign Philhellenes, many had doubts as to the efficacy of this measure.

“When the alternative is national independence or personal degradation, there can be no nobler object in life than to fight for freedom. But even a sincere Philhellene may doubt whether the year 1866 was wisely selected as a suitable time for exchanging the fitful self-government, tolerated by the Sultan in the Island of Crete, for the centralized tyranny of gen-darmes, that prevails in the kingdom of Greece at present.”*

It can no longer be said that an island containing one hundred and twenty thousand Mussulmen, among an entire population of three hundred and five thousand souls, must be essentially a fraction of the *Greek* nationality, and that the proposition of annexation can be based on the principle of nationalitism.

The Sultan himself could not apply this pretended principle (as creating his claim) to the Island of Crete, though the Mussulmen on the island would never consent to become the subjects of the King of Greece, but would exterminate themselves rather than submit thereto. If the Island of Crete should be assigned to any Power, in view of the claim of national traditions, that Power would not be Athens, which never owned the island; but rather the Republic of Venice, and the kingdom of Italy, heir of Venice, which governed this island during four centuries, formed its harbors, built its cities, and created it the general commercial depot of the old world up to 1669.

* London Times correspondence of September 5, 1868.

The Powers being once persuaded that the Porte would never consent, of its own will, to a cession of Candia to Greece, proposed an investigation, which should be directed by an international commission; but the Turkish Government, beside having in its hands evident proofs of the connivance of Russia and Greece with the insurrection, regarded this new suggestion as useless, and contrary to the dispositions of the treaty of 1856. Moreover, the European States had no agents in Crete capable of conducting such an investigation. Was the true cause of the insurrection insufficiently understood?

Finally, these Powers believed themselves obligated by the interests of humanity to gather on their vessels those Cretan families which were without food and shelter, and to transport them into Greece. What were the results of this measure, enacted in despite of the protestations of the Porte; this direct intervention, which Russia would never have endured in the case of Poland, nor the United States during the recent civil war, though undertaken in the name of the most disinterested humanity, served only to encourage the insurrection and augment the effusion of blood.

“As sympathy was no longer to be won by the display of warriors’ valor, an attempt was made to enlist it by the exhibition of martyrs’ sufferings. A general exodus of the Cretan population was organized. Russian and American vessels willingly—French, Italian, and even English, stupidly—lent themselves to the Greek dodge. The evil is now done; the island is a wilderness; of its population, about 50,000 souls are starving in Greece. It is in behalf of these that Mr. Skinner will find it hard, however, to overcome the mistrust universally entertained with respect to Greek and Cretan committees. Public rumor accuses them of great abuses, and flour sent out for the relief of destitute families becomes bran before it arrives at its destination.”*

* London Times.

Cruelties committed in Crete.

Was this intervention in the least justified by the cruelty of the repression? . In other words, how much of truth is there in the recitals of massacre and of acts of violence, which emanated from the committees of Syria and of Athens, and were repeated with confidence by all the journals of the new world? The victorious bulletins issuing from these same committees have already been reduced to their just proportions; he who would accept them unquestioningly would be obliged to admit that the Turkish army, after having massacred the entire population, had been itself completely exterminated in Crete, in those heroic struggles where volunteers fought entire days with a loss not exceeding four or five men. Is this saying that no excesses were committed? Far from it. Americans, unfortunately, do not need to study the history of Europe in order to learn the evils which civil war draws in its train, when continued for several years. It is only too certain that during the second year of the strife particularly, there were cruelties committed on one and the other side, but it behooves us to inquire who were the *first* authors of these excesses, and on whom are we to lay the responsibility of the blood spilt? Aali Pacha was able to say, at the outbreak of the insurrection, "in spite of the calumnies which the Greek journals propagate, "not a drop of Christian blood has been shed up to this hour, while the Christians pitilessly assassinate the forsaken Mussulmen;"* and he elsewhere adds: "The Cretan ringleaders have thrown aside the mask, and have taken the initiative in attack. After having issued proclamations relative to their irrevocable determination of annexation to the Hellenic kingdom, they ceased to confine themselves to the assassination of isolated

* Circular of Aali Pacha to the Grand Powers, 8th September, 1866.

* Aali Pacha to Photiades Bey, 21st August, 1866.

* Telegrams of Aali Pacha to the six grand Powers, 8th and 17th September, 1866.

Mussulmen, and offered battle to our troops." By whom were these reported cruelties committed? Certainly not by the regular troops of Turkey, to whom Mr. Dickson, the British consul, thus renders justice, on the 3d of September, 1866, on occasion of an encounter between Greeks and Mussulmen, whom these troops separated "without firing a shot. The conduct of the troops on this, as on other sad occasions, has been praiseworthy." *

Still later, when the quarrel had become envenomed and volunteers were in line, Lord Lyons thus deplores the excesses committed by both parties, yet at the same time making allowance for exaggerations: "No belief can be given to the intelligence from Crete made public in Greece. No doubt the stories of atrocities committed by the Mussulmen, which are rife in that country, are, if not untrue, for the most part greatly exaggerated. But however this may be, the island is in a deplorable state, and it is only too probable that acts of cruelty and violence, incompatible with the usages of civilized warfare, are perpetrated on both sides." *

Whom do we find, however, in the ranks of those famous volunteers, whose heroism has been so ceaselessly vaunted. By the side of some young men, drawn to Crete by noble and chivalrous sentiments, we find a medley of adventurers and bandits, coming from all quarters of Europe, dangerous to those who enrolled them, and whose sad exploits would quickly disgust their honest companions in arms. Mr. Lloyd, English consul at Syra, wrote on the 2d of January, 1867: "For the last few days the town has been in some confusion and alarm on account of the violent conduct of the volunteers. Three people have been severely wounded, quite innocently, merely by the balls flying about, which the volunteers are constantly discharging from their guns and pistols. The authorities are completely powerless to deprive them of their arms till they go, and we are all in about the same state, if not worse, than during the revolution." * The same agent

* Parliamentary Papers.

wrote on the 19th of January, 1867: "There are still here some fifty vagabonds, who want to go, or rather be clothed, armed, fed, and sent to Crete; but the committee have told them they are not wanted there, and do not mean to equip or send them; meantime they have tried a little extortion by threats on the shopkeepers. Mr. Tricoupi likewise informs me that the Government are extremely embarrassed to know what to do with these would-be volunteers. They are flocking in from Smyrna, Salonica, and all parts of the Levant, and are generally characters of the worst description. If they are sent to Crete, it will again be said, that this is a breach of neutrality, whilst they would become a fresh source of annoyance to the unfortunate Cretans. But, on the other hand, if these men are allowed to remain in Greece, they will probably live by stealing, and swell the already large criminal population of Greece."*

The scruples of the cabinet at Athens do not seem to have been serious, for on the 31st of October, 1867, the *Enosis* transported ninety brigands of Acarnania, who had obtained pardon on condition that they should repair to Crete. If these volunteers had so little self-restraint when among their friends, what might they not be expected to do in a strange country. Let us follow them into Crete. Mr. Erskine wrote on the 9th of January, 1866: "Some two hundred of the foreign volunteers were so disgusted with the whole affair that they would gladly leave the island."* Mr. Dickson adds, that he can vouch for the fact that many excesses have been committed by these men, greatly to the annoyance of the unhappy Cretans."* Some young Garibaldians, who fought in Crete, hastened to return thence, and have since published their impressions. One of these Garibaldians wrote from Brindes, on the 17th of March, 1867: "I had determined to remain in the ranks of the insurgents until the last moment, and to accept all consequences; but when I perceived that, after six months of strife, the revolution had accomplished no positive

* Parliamentary Papers.

result, thanks to the base characters, ambitions, and dissensions of the leaders, and to the complete defect of the military organization, I sought some method of withdrawal, that I might not have to assume the responsibility of acts of barbarity and inhumanity enacted against poor native families, in whom it was found a crime to remain indifferent to the struggle." *

Another wrote from Syra: "All know that one of the boldest and most redoubtable chiefs in the insurrection is the famous Crearis de Pelicano. Well, this man, a few years before the outbreak of the revolution, was a brigand chief, and to-day he is the able captain, who, the revolution being successful, would become deputy and colonel. It is horrible to relate. Do you know what this renowned man has done? At the battle of Tupoya, fought in the month of February last, having taken prisoners an officer and two Turkish soldiers, he ordered that they should be stripped, and having bound them to a tree, he made them serve as targets to the knife-points of his (seides) or soldiers. You cannot imagine the horror I experienced at the sight of such savagery, on the part of men who had appealed to civilized Europe to be released from the yoke of the Mussulman oppressor. I essayed to obtain a speedier death for these unfortunates, but the great captain threatened me with the same fate if I persisted. I then turned my eyes away from this bloody scene, but was obliged in spite of myself to remain at hand, to hear the yells of the hyena-like executioners and the heart-rending lamentations of their victims. Our ferocious brigands of meridional Italy are, I assure you, more humane than this species of insurgents; but impartial history will record these acts, as well as other similar ones, which prove conclusively that this people are not yet worthy of liberty, and that all civilized people cannot but blush to call them brothers." *

These barbarities, which recall to mind the horrible recitals

* Truth about the Cretan Insurrection, by Garibaldian Volunteers, 1867.

of Lucretius, where the poet represents to us men who employed wild beasts as combatants in the ranks of their armies, do not in any degree justify the acts of vengeance exercised by the Mussulmen, but they at least explain them, and deprive the Greeks of all right to reproach them.

Deplorable condition of the Cretan refugees.

After the emigrant Cretans, torn in most instances from their firesides by intimidation, had passed the winter in Greece, and had compared Hellenic hospitality with Mussulman tyranny, they asked with earnestness to be restored to their own country. The American Philhellenes, who conceived the excellent idea of going in person to distribute among these unfortunates the supplies collected in New York and Boston, know in what frightful destitution they found them, and they must have imagined with a shudder the evils which would have annihilated them, had not abundant subscriptions been received from abroad on their behalf. Mr. Jules Ballot, on his return, saw these emigrants at Athens, dying of starvation and misery, with their dishonored families. "In the month of July, 1867, he said there were eighty young Cretan girls in the hospital at Athens, whose beautiful Cretan blood had been vitiated and corrupted by contact with Greek civilization."*

"It is difficult," said the correspondent of the *Times*, "to reach Cretan distress; and, on the other hand, neither Greece herself nor Western Philhellenism is equal to the task of feeding 50,000 helpless persons. It is absolutely necessary that these refugees should go back to their deserted villages and untilled fields, although we are told that not 500 of the emigrants are willing to return; and from a telegraph from Athens, dated August 31, we learn that a part of the population of that city was opposing the departure of the Cretan families anxious to go back to their country."

* Work cited above.

This opposition which the emigrant Cretans encountered, so soon as they manifested a desire to return homeward, proceeded from the committees who had organized the insurrection, and whose intrigues this departure disconcerted. The opposition expressed itself in acts of violence and unheard-of barbarities, when the refugees resisted other means of intimidation. Vainly did they demand the protection of the minister of the Porte at Athens and of the Ottoman consul general at Syra. They could never succeed in embarking without being assailed by a furious populace, and without having some of their number more or less severely wounded. The representative of the Porte pointed out these much-to-be-regretted facts to Mr. Bulgaris on several occasions, but was unable to obtain assurance that these emigrant Cretans should receive efficacious protection. He wrote, on the 3d of August: "The population of Pirea has been an eye-witness of the hideous spectacle which the horrible incidents of the past two weeks have presented. We have seen women and children assailed in the carriages which were conveying them to the place of debarkation by bands of fanatics who, by blows of clubs and stones, sought to prevent their departure, and pushed their violence even to the point of tearing away infants of tender age from the maternal breast. All this occurred under the eyes of the police, who by their intervention only succeeded in alleviating the evil, without being able to suppress it." As the remonstrances of Photiades Bey produced no result, Fuad Pacha, on the 19th August, 1867, addressed a circular to the grand Powers, in which we read: "By my former various dispatches, I have deemed it best to advise you of the vexations and atrocities of every kind of which the Cretan families preparing to return to their own country are the objects in Greece, on the part of the agents of committees. More than once already, the representative of the Sublime Porte at Athens and our consul general at Syra have found it necessary to call upon the Hellenic authorities to put a stop to the revolting scenes which recur on every occasion of embarkation of these families; but, unhap-

pily, the reiterated assurances given to Photiades Bey of the punishment of the culprits and a prevention of a recurrence of the same acts have up to this time been without result." The cabinet of Athens now understood that it was necessary to exhibit at least an appearance of energy in the matter; in order to forestall the representations of other Powers, and they decided to place an effective check upon the violence of these committees. On the 2d of October, 1868, the bulletin of the French *Moniteur* contained these words: "The Hellenic Government has caused the arrest of some of the authors of violence and pillage, of which a large number of Cretan families have been the victims at the moment of embarkation at Pirea. It promises, moreover, to allow indemnities to the unfortunates who have suffered from these deplorable aggressions. Public opinion, which has severely judged such acts, will be as ready to encourage the efforts made for their repression."

However, the Ottoman consul general at Syra, on the 2d of August, started forty families for Crete; in the week following more than two hundred emigrants arrived at Canea; and finally, on the 26th of August, one hundred and seventeen departed in their turn for their own country. But the good will of the Hellenic Government towards this measure was not of long duration; seeing the movement of the emigrants towards their native land to become general, the Government again permitted the committees to impede their action with every kind of obstacle. A report of Photiades Bey, dated October 18, states that eighteen Cretans repaired to Athens; with design to reassemble and conduct back to Crete their own emigrant families, and all who should choose to follow them. By their express request, Photiades Bey sought the concurrence of the Hellenic Government in the protection of the embarkation of these families, which were at Egine. But the cabinet of Athens, having deliberated upon this demand, declared to Photiades Bey "that they found it impossible to *foresee* the dangers which might arise for those Cretans who wished to depart, and not being able, therefore, to provide in

advance measures of security in their behalf, they must leave such of them to run the chances of aggression elsewhere evident."

The representatives of England, France, and Austria, at Athens, were advised of the deplorable condition in which these unhappy families were thus placed, and vainly endeavored to make the Hellenic Government realize the grave responsibility which their action assumed.

The Turkish Government, on its part, knowing that many emigrants were detained in Greece by lack of means of transport, arranged with Lloyd's company for the organization of a line of vessels, which should make the trip to the island, and stop at certain landing-places where the Austrian packets did not touch; and that they should receive these Cretan families and return them to their homes. It was thus that, on the 25th of November, the *Shild*, a packet of Trieste, escorted by a steam-gunboat, transported five hundred emigrants from Greece to Canea.

Actual state of affairs in Crete.

This anxiety of the refugee Cretans to return to their own firesides is the clearest proof that the pacification of the island may be considered complete. At the end of the month of August last, a large number of insurgents had offered submission. In the Province of Canea, the inhabitants of the village of Samaria, which was the last refuge of the rebels, had laid down their arms. The animosities which two years of civil war had aroused already commence to diminish, which fact might have been stated on the 15th of August last. Since the earliest times, in the village of St. Basil, belonging to the Province of Pediada, an (annual) pilgrimage to the Monastery of the Virgin of the Grotto, called Siliahissa, has been customary; in which pilgrimage Christians as well as Mussulmen took part, without distinction. This custom, abandoned since the commencement of hostilities, has been renewed this year, with the same pomp as formerly. We read in the correspond-

ence of the Canea, of September 14th, that there had been no engagement between the Turkish troops and the insurgents for eight days, that tranquillity had not been disturbed in any part of the island, that all the ways of communication leading to Kissamos, Selino, and Apocorona, were open, that the Turks passed peaceably from village to village, seeking the most comfortable places for the installation of their families during the harvest, the insurgents having disappeared, and having retired into the mountains of Rethymno, Milopotamo, and Aya Vassili. Without doubt there are still from time to time engagements at divers points, and no army, however numerous or disciplined, can in a few months completely establish security in a country which, thanks to its wild features and inaccessible mountains, has been for all time, like Calabria, Spain, Mexico, and even Greece itself, a shelter for bandits. Of late the insurgents receive no succor from the population, and are supplied with arms and food only by the committees of Athens and Syra; while the Turkish troops have long since ceased to pursue an intangible enemy, every day growing less in number. They confine themselves to the protection of peaceable villages against aggression, and to establishing themselves strongly by means of block-houses. Thus the Greek committees, seeing that the island has escaped them irretrievably, make an earnest effort to supply there the leaven of civil war. Pressed by the native chiefs, to whom they have promised for two years the intervention of a foreign Power, they have applied to England, through the intermediation of the British minister at Athens; but the cabinet of London replied, that they recognized no insurrection, and no provisional government in Crete. Since that time a number of the chiefs have tendered their submission. Photiades Bey wrote from Athens, on the 9th of September last:

“All the foreign consuls residing at Candia have announced officially to their respective ministers at Athens, that the work of the pacification of the island has advanced rapidly. Some persons, in order to palliate the lie which facts have given to their prognostications, attribute this reversion

to the abundance of the olive-harvest, which is greater than even before. The chiefs of the bands of insurgents asked succor, and the committees gave them 300,000 drachmes, proceeding, it is said, "from the subscriptions of foreign Philhellenists. This sum has been partly employed in the purchase of munitions of war; the rest will be sent in cash, with the arms, by the *Enosis*. The committees directed Zimbrakaki, to return to Crete, to direct the insurrection in the Province of Sphakia. He left on the 8th of September, in the evening, for Syra and Candia. In Athens more importance is given to the returns of this chief to Crete, at the head of a new expedition, because it is proposed to make use of this fact to change public opinion in Europe, by creating thus the impression that the insurrection has acquired new force."

But in the future these chiefs of bands will find a country pacified and organized, people who are undeceived, and little disposed to plunge into new adventures. Moreover a very recent circular dispatch, which the Porte has addressed to the foreign agents, announces that the residue of these insurgent chiefs have called upon the consuls of France, England, and Russia, for a vessel which shall transport them in security to Greece.

Reforms accorded to Crete by the Sultan.

The Sultan, who deemed it best, in view of his own dignity, to decline the solutions proposed by other Powers, (these Powers having laid aside their responsibility in the matter, and abandoned sterile negotiations,) himself took the initiative in reforms, and applied to Crete an organization with which many other provinces of the empire had already been endowed—the organization of "*Vilayets*."

We give in a few words the substance of this regime, whose plan is found in detail in the English collection of papers, to which reference was made in the beginning of this document.

The general administration of the island, separated from

the military command, is confided to a governor general, assisted by two counsellors, the one chosen among the Mussulmen, the other from among the Christian functionaries of the empire. The island is divided into districts and cantons, administered by governors, of whom half are Mussulmen, and the other half Christians. Every governor has at hand a council of administration, and tribunals (of mixed nationality) whose members are elected by the population. A general council, also elected by the people, is charged with investigation of questions of internal administration, and with control of the use of public funds. Moreover, the Cretans, from the 1st of March, 1868, are to be exempted for two years from the usual tithes; at the end of which time they will be called to pay a half only of the tenth-part tax for the two years following.

Has this new organization been sincerely and seriously put in practice, or does it rest as a dead letter on the statute-book? We present the contents of a circular sent, on the 1st of September last, by Fuad Pacha, to the six grand Powers of Europe:

“I need not dwell upon the importance and great value of the administrative and judicial reforms with which the Island of Crete has been endowed. They are known to-day to all the world, and impartial Europe can appreciate them. They testify nobly to the spirit of progress and liberalism with which the Imperial Government is animated, while, at the same time, they designate the utmost limits of concession, compatible with its dignity and incontestible rights.” And, further on he adds: “We may say boldly to-day, that the pacification of the island is complete. The regular government fulfills its functions without any hindrance; an efficacious protection is afforded to all the inhabitants, who are not under the power of those bands of insurgents who still seek to uphold the flag of revolt on the summit of the mountains.”

CONCLUSION.

Resting on the preceding statements, the honorable authors of the resolution of the 21st of July may feel assured that the Government of the Sultan, in the sympathy which it has manifested for the unhappy Cretans, proves itself in accord with the Philhellenists of the United States Senate. In effect, while the resolution of Mr. Sumner asked the Porte to render to Crete the benefits of peace, and of an autonomic government, the Sultan suspended hostilities, and sent his grand vizier, Aali Pacha, to carry to his emigrant subjects words of pardon, peace, and conciliation. He granted to the island the reforms of 10th January, 1868, and ordered their faithful application by this high functionary. Let those who have ever for a moment entertained the idea of annexing Candia to Greece search in this latter kingdom for a province which enjoys an administration more independent, or more autonomic, than that conceded to the island of Crete. Greece is at this moment a prey to anarchy, as is Russia to despotism. Did the Czar (the Polish insurrection being smothered) offer amnesty to the guilty, restore the emigrants to their country at his expense, exempt them from taxation, and accord to them that self-government on whom the organization of the *Vilayets* is founded? May the American Philhellenists graciously permit this observation: We also are Philhellenes; but our Philhellenism, more eclectic than theirs, does not extend indiscriminately to all the Greeks of times past, present, and future; it ceases with the century of Demosthenes. After the death of this grand orator, Greece, abandoned to these sophists and courtizans, depicted by Menander, discovers to our *presentiments* her future fall in the times of Juvenal and of the Bas Empire.

The heroes of modern Greece inspire us with but moderate admiration, because they style themselves, pompously, as *Clephtes*, while *Clephthe*, in plain English, means *robber*; and we seek in vain to discern in these *Clephtes* any characteristics of Demosthenes and Pericles. In substance, these

enthusiastic Philhellenes think as we do. If any descendant of Miltiades or Leonidas should manifest a desire to renew in the United States the exploits of Jason, or of these modern *Clephtes*, his genealogical tree, however authentic and venerable, would not shelter him from the strong hand of power. We do not desire other proofs of this assertion than that already given in the expeditious manner with which the bold robbers were lynched who last year robbed the post on the Erie railroad. A nation does not allow its moral sentiment to be assailed with impunity. If, on the one hand, Greece, after forty years of liberty, is still to-day without agriculture, without roads, without railroads, without a stable government, and without credit, or consideration, it is because in that country, unhappily, we find *Clephtes* on every side. If, on the other hand, America has arrived as rapidly at that unheard-of degree of prosperity and power, which inspires the astonishment and respect of the Old World, it is because she endeavors to place her Government in the hands of honest men, of those whom Plato called "*aristoi*"—the better class. It is because each American citizen presents to his children, as a model of virtue and patriotism, the noble and pure character of Washington, as the cotemporaries of Pericles sought the type of physical beauty in the master-pieces of Phidias and Praxiteles.

The brevity of our résumé of events in Crete explains why we have not paused to notice either the resolution of Mr. Shanks, (June 23) or that of Mr. Loughridge (July 20) upon this same subject. In fact, these two resolutions, although inspired by a laudable and generous sentiment, digress from the real point in view; and, being based on a false interpretation of facts, propose a method of accommodation at once chimerical and impracticable. If, for sake of argument, we should imagine the American cabinet seriously to present such resolutions to Europe, not only would they seem entirely to ignore all outside events, but they would, at any given moment, place the Government of the Union in this alternative: either to withdraw or to advance much further than would result in advantage to this country. It is a fact

admitted and recognized in Europe, that the constitution of the Americans, their principles, and their political customs, naturally lead them to sympathize with any revolution which has for its object the downfall of despotism. It surprises no one when they testify these sentiments toward an oppressed people. But they should, notwithstanding, live in good will with all the world, and more particularly with those countries which do not so readily assimilate with them. In order to maintain such relations, they must confine themselves within the limits imposed by international law, in its respect for the independence of each State. It would be, then, a forgetfulness of their obligations of neutrality towards Turkey, to give to an insurrection, which all the world considers as suppressed, and which is no longer mentioned in Europe, an importance and a moral aid which no longer comport with it, and which would result, perhaps, in leading them far beyond the end they had in view. On the contrary, whenever they shall utter to others words of counsel, conceived in a friendly spirit of wisdom and moderation, such as those which find expression in the resolution of the Senate, of July 21st, they will have the opportunity and the right to be heard. But if, in despite of facts, they show a determination to impose their ideas upon those who are not obliged to think as they do, they will simply run the risk of encountering legitimate resistance, and of thwarting their own plan of justice and humanity.

Since these pages were written, news of a breach between Turkey and Greece has been received. It became unavoidable, after the recklessness of Grecian Government in communicating to the House of Representatives of Athens, in the early part of November last, statements gravely implicating its good faith.

Mr. Kehaya, former minister of finances, was rash enough to enumerate specifically the serious sacrifices which the preceding government had made to sustain and foster the Cretan outbreak.

Mr. Delyanni, the present minister of foreign affairs, protested with emphasis against the vacillation and inability charged upon the King's government.

A debate ensued, in which that same Mr. Delyanni declared, without reserve, that every conceivable effort had been made by the present administration to bring about the annexation of the Island of Crete to the kingdom of Greece.

In view of so explicit an admission of the actual participation of the Hellenic Government in the events which have recently transpired in Crete, no other alternative was left to the Sultan than a declaration of war against Greece.

Had he abstained from availing himself of that, the last resort of injured nations, and confined himself to an ultimatum, in order to secure practical guarantees for the future, he was undoubtedly governed by the consideration that a great Power should not wage war against a small one, which has neither army, nor navy, nor money, nor credit.

It must also be stated that Greece was up to to-day too much emboldened by the forbearance of Turkey. Nevertheless, if Greece recklessly persists in turning a deaf ear to the counsels of wisdom, and in refusing the just and reasonable satisfaction due to the Sultan, there is every reason to believe that, according to the latest news, a struggle between Turkey and Greece cannot be long deferred.

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